Discussion Paper presented at the National Consultative Workshop on the Formulation of the R-NACP July 27, 2012 Lusaka
1.0 Introduction
Our blueprint for the fight against corruption has so far been a
promulgation of a plethora of anti-corruption legislation; establishment of
various public bodies whose mandate is prevention, investigation and
prosecution of corruption; reforms in how government does business and provides
services to the public[1];
and, reform the judiciary so that serious economic crime and complicated corruption
cases are expediently dealt with. Notwithstanding that establishment of
anti-corruption bodies, legislation review and reforms are critical, year in
year out corruption measurement indices are evidencing the contrary.
Could it be that, we are always missing something? Or, that corruption
is a virus that mutates immediately
we develop a new vaccine? Or perhaps, our blueprint might be lacking factual basis or historical validity!
This discussion Paper argues that whereas we could be missing something, the efforts
made so far are commendable. The evidenced shortcomings simply necessitate that
there should be a comprehensive review of our long - established assumptions
and practices - with such review necessitating more efforts towards a
collective will to achieve collective behavioural change, because corruption is
an “enemy that fights back”[2].
This Paper in addressing itself to the topic “International Experiences
and Best Practices in National Anti-Corruption Policies (NACP): A dialectic
understanding of the effective ways into the fight against can ‘enemy that fights back’”, seeks to
provide a contradiction of ideas that serves as the determining factor in their
interaction and navigating the way forward.
2.0 International Experiences
International experiences in anti-corruption are replete with insights
of the flaws in the choice of terms or concepts used in anti corruption
strategies or policies. This Paper highlights a few.
Holistic, broad-based approach, and
coordinated approach
The quest for a holistic, broad-based approach and coordinated approach
to anti-corruption has been a lullaby of past anti-corruption strategies.
Experiences so far have evidenced that the approach has difficulties in setting
priorities, sequencing and ownership. Turner and Hulm (1997) argue that
“national ownership can be “kidnapped” by national elites, who may steer
anti-corruption approaches towards areas that are not too damaging or sensitive
for the powers in place; and that national initiatives may also just be the
result of international pressure behind the scenes, while real ownership is
lacking”[3].
Turner and Hulm (1997), however, observe that “the politics of anti-corruption
policy making have been largely neglected, although an understanding of the political
context and policy dynamics is crucial for quality policies”[4].
In addition, Hussmann (2007) observes that “institutional arrangements to coordinate
and oversee implementation of the initiatives are often ill-conceived from the
start, as anti-corruption agencies usually do not have the authority,
leadership and political backing to compel powerful line ministries to comply
with anti-corruption measures[5].
Further, Hussmann (2007) argues that “putting anti-corruption strategies
into practice is challenging for the simple reason that they cut across
numerous public agencies, interact with other public management reforms and,
most importantly, encounter high levels of resistance; and that “in most
developing countries policy implementation phases are the ones where political
and economic actors most vividly play their cards in an attempt to capture,
torpedo, distort or sidetrack reforms in line with their interests”.
Severe mismatch between political problems and technocratic solutions
There is often a severe mismatch between political problems and
technocratic solutions. Thence, Hussmann (2007) argues that, despite the
recognition that corruption is to a large extent a political problem,
anti-corruption strategies or policies unfortunately deal with the phenomenon
largely as a technocratic and procedural issue[6].
Enhance transparency
In hindsight, it is now argued that transparency may actually simply strengthen
already-influential interests well-placed to capitalise upon access and
openness, and can even facilitate corruption[7].
This is, wherein, transparency is not enhanced in a manner that does not
provide citizens the incentive or reason to “look in” and feel safe to do so; and, to have the political resources
and opportunities to act on what they see[8].
This Paper also establishes that, although there is “openness” in
anti-corruption strategy or policy formulation in developing countries it is
often more a product of the State elite than non-State actors, and that most
stakeholders are generally ill informed about policy development issues, thus
leaving the elite to fashion mass options in policy development and
implementation. Further, during implementation the open
and transparent spaces (the “look in”) for information exchange or the
monitoring of progress are often closed, because, governments have had the
tendency to close their doors; or only open selectively to identified non-State
actors[9].
Laws, laws and laws; and, anti-corruption
agencies
Many countries have anti-corruption laws on the books (even if penalties
need updating) and an anti-corruption agency of some sort ((with numerous Donor
funded intervention – the question of sustainability). However, societal
behaviours are such that only a few individuals in our societies have a
compelling stake in their success. In addition, support from the Courts and prosecutors
is often weak or absent, and enforcement is often ineffective.
Civil Society impact
That civil society has a central role to play in corruption control is inarguable.
However, the view of civil society participation in anti-corruption is often
narrow and merely serves to have minimal impact. The problem is. Many civil-society
actors exist in formal organisations that advocate reform as a public good;
and, in developing countries such organisations are donor-funded, operate
mostly in and around national capitals, and are guided by donors’ agendas[10].
The thought now is that, the strength of civil society actually lies in informal
social groupings and activities that have little to do with public purposes yet
still build social capital in the form of networks, skills, and trust that can
be mobilised in the fight against corruption. Johnston and Johnsøn (2014) argue
that, “collective action cannot rely solely on formal purpose-oriented organisations,
but must engage a wider range of social ties and incentives”.
3.0 Best Practices in National Anti-Corruption
Policies
This Paper, first, acknowledges that the author is averse to the term,
“best practices”. For best practices are contextual, and the concept can
sometimes be conceived to mean “one shoe
size fits all”.
Michael Johnston’s introduction in “Reforming Reform: Revising the
Anticorruption Playbook” aptly puts it. Johnston argues.
“Best practices” are elusive and do not always transfer well from one
setting to the next. However, “better practices” are possible if we understand
how corruption arises as a political and social issue, and how well governed societies
got that way. We often turn history upside down, overemphasizing reform from
above while neglecting contention from below; and get history backward by
mistaking outcomes of contention for the causes of better government. “Deep
democratisation”–enabling citizens to demand justice and better
government–tailored to contrasting situations and syndromes may yield better
long-term result” [11].
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the “best practices” in national
anti-corruption polices, literature shows, among others, are those that focus
on:
(a)
Blending localised knowledge, intent and
purpose as critical elements of anti-corruption.
(b)
Legislative and other measures necessary
to establish as criminal offences active and passive bribery when committed
intentionally, and when committed intentionally in the course of economic,
financial or commercial activities, i.e. including the private sector.
(c)
Measures and systems to facilitate
reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities,
when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their duties, and
provide protection for doing so; and, with such measures being inclusive of
members of the public - whistle-blower protection legislation.
(d)
Measures requiring public officials to
make declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their
outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or
benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their
functions as public officials.
(e)
Rules of conduct for all public officials
in order to strengthen integrity and prevent opportunities for corruption among
its members.
(f)
Need for to encourage honest employees to
raise their concerns and report wrongdoing within the workplace without fear, a
crucial corporate governance tool to promote safe, accountable and responsive
work environments
(g)
Need for multi-disciplinary approach as
evidenced by having one agency specialised in investigating and prosecuting
such cases.
(h)
A streamlined fast tracked procedure from
charge to finalisation.
(i)
Target society based intervention seeking
to influence change in behaviours and norms.
4.0 Retrospect - The effective way to fight an
“enemy that fights back”
First, we
must accept that the failures of policies is because policies are created by a
multiplicity of actors with a plethora of, often conflicting and at times
changing political and financial interests.
One of the most salient
features of public policy making is that, it is not a highly rational process
with static goals. Thence, it is observed that, policy making is often a “fuzzy
betting attempt to influence the probability to future situations”[12]. For,
the major threat to anti-corruption policies is that they restrict power, as
they affect the distribution of or access to political power and reduce
opportunities to accumulate (illicit) economic wealth.
Second, corruption
not only adapts to particular circumstances, but the circumstances may also
adapt to established corruption dynamics; and measures that exclusively target
corruption do not always make a difference[13]. Hussmann (2007) buttresses this argument by observing that – “Corruption is often compared to a disease
or a cancer and just as in the medical field a reasonable diagnosis is needed
to decide how to cure the disease by addressing its causes, not simply the
symptoms”.
Third, corrupt
individuals do not necessarily set out to win against those opposed to them,
but instead to perpetuate or to create a status quo to increase their
privileges or financial gain; thus, corruption could be considered an infinite
game[14].
Fourth, corruption always has evasive action. It always
gets us looking in the wrong direction, and draws us into a delusion of
anti-corruption activity. Because, corruption always finds its way by changing the rules, overstepping them
or taking new forms as the world evolves.
Lastly,
corruption is cannibalistic.
In retrospect, it is
inarguable that corruption is an “enemy
that fights back”. How then do we effectively fight this enemy?
To understand, the effective
ways, we here cite two critical viewpoints. These are from Daniel Kaufmann[15] and Corinna Wong[16] .
Daniel Kaufmann writes.
“Corruption is a symptom of a larger disease - the failure of
institutions and governance, resulting in poor management of revenues and
resources and an absence of delivery of public goods and services. We must
think beyond anti-corruption rhetoric and traditional tactics. We need to be
more strategic and rigorous, identifying and addressing corruption’s underlying
causes and examining the weaknesses in key institutions and government policies
and practices. We have to focus our efforts on the broader context of
governance and accountability. Only then can we see the many other shapes and
forms corruption can take and address this epidemic”[17].
And, Corinna Wong writes.
“The fight against corruption is always more
than bringing culprits to justice and plugging loopholes conducive to the
crime. It is also about changing people’s attitudes towards corruption and
misconduct. Corruption perpetuates if the population tolerates it and sees it
as a way of life. On the other hand, in a community with a strong probity culture,
people are more likely to appreciate fair competition, reject bribery, and
cooperate with law enforcement agencies when encountering corruption. Public
support is therefore fundamental to the success of an anti-corruption campaign”.
In conclusion, perhaps, the effective way to fight an “enemy that fights back”, this Paper
observes, in part, can be learned from Corinna Wong’s TAPE. That is,
anti-corruption should -
(a)
Have a Target - oriented
strategy - customise anti-corruption services for different target
groups;
(b)
Have an All-round communication strategy - integrate face-to-face contacts with multimedia publicity to spread the
probity messages to people from all walks of life through multiple platforms.
(c)
Have a Partnership strategy - partner with different
stakeholders in the community to promote integrity;
and have an,
(d)
Engagement strategy - engage members of the public
to take ownership of the anti-corruption cause and garner their support for
preventive education activities.
[1] Reform
public procurement process, public financial management systems, regulate
emoluments in the public sector, et cetera.
[2] Adapted from
Phil Mason - Twenty years with anti-corruption: reflections on reflections (https://www.u4.no/twenty-years-with-anti-corruption)
[3] Turner, M.
and Hulm, D. (1997), “Governance, administration and development”, McMillan
Press, London, UK
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hussmann, K. (2007). Anti-corruption policy making in practice:
What can be learned for implementing Article 5 of UNCAC? Synthesis report of six
country case studies:Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania, and
Zambia. U4 report 2007:1 (1st part), U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr.
Michelsen Institute, Norway
[6] Ibid
[7] Johnson,
M. (2014). Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep
Democratization. Cambridge University Press.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Hussmann, K. (2007). Anti-corruption policy making in practice:
What can be learned for implementing Article 5 of UNCAC? Synthesis report of
six country case studies:Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania, and
Zambia. U4 report 2007:1 (1st part), U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr.
Michelsen Institute, Norway
[10] Michael
Johnston and Jesper Johnsøn (with Olivia T. Gamble), “Doing the Wrong Things
for the Right Reasons? ‘Do No Harm’ as a Principle of Reform,” U4 Brief 13,
December 2014, http://www.u4.no/publications/doing-the-wrong-things-for-the-right-reasons-do-no-harm
-as-a-principle-of-reform/downloadasset/3696.
[11] 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
[12] Shull, R. (2007). Rush to Policy: Using Analytic Techniques in
Public Sector Decision Making. Routledge
[13] https://voices.transparency.org/why-are-anti-corruption-success-stories-still-the-exception-9a30e5f4cf39
[14] Ibid.
[15] President, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
[16] Assistant Director, Assistant Director of Community Relations Department of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, Hong Kong, China
[17]
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rethinking-the-fight-against-corruption/
