Wednesday, July 27, 2022

A dialectic understanding of the effective ways into the fight against can "enemy that fights back"

 

Discussion Paper presented at the National Consultative Workshop on the Formulation of the R-NACP July 27, 2012 Lusaka


1.0  Introduction

Our blueprint for the fight against corruption has so far been a promulgation of a plethora of anti-corruption legislation; establishment of various public bodies whose mandate is prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption; reforms in how government does business and provides services to the public[1]; and, reform the judiciary so that serious economic crime and complicated corruption cases are expediently dealt with. Notwithstanding that establishment of anti-corruption bodies, legislation review and reforms are critical, year in year out corruption measurement indices are evidencing the contrary.

Could it be that, we are always missing something? Or, that corruption is a virus that mutates immediately we develop a new vaccine? Or perhaps, our blueprint might be lacking factual basis or historical validity!

This discussion Paper argues that whereas we could be missing something, the efforts made so far are commendable. The evidenced shortcomings simply necessitate that there should be a comprehensive review of our long - established assumptions and practices - with such review necessitating more efforts towards a collective will to achieve collective behavioural change, because corruption is an “enemy that fights back”[2].

This Paper in addressing itself to the topic “International Experiences and Best Practices in National Anti-Corruption Policies (NACP): A dialectic understanding of the effective ways into the fight against can ‘enemy that fights back’”, seeks to provide a contradiction of ideas that serves as the determining factor in their interaction and navigating the way forward.

2.0  International Experiences

International experiences in anti-corruption are replete with insights of the flaws in the choice of terms or concepts used in anti corruption strategies or policies. This Paper highlights a few.

Holistic, broad-based approach, and coordinated approach

The quest for a holistic, broad-based approach and coordinated approach to anti-corruption has been a lullaby of past anti-corruption strategies. Experiences so far have evidenced that the approach has difficulties in setting priorities, sequencing and ownership. Turner and Hulm (1997) argue that “national ownership can be “kidnapped” by national elites, who may steer anti-corruption approaches towards areas that are not too damaging or sensitive for the powers in place; and that national initiatives may also just be the result of international pressure behind the scenes, while real ownership is lacking”[3]. Turner and Hulm (1997), however, observe that “the politics of anti-corruption policy making have been largely neglected, although an understanding of the political context and policy dynamics is crucial for quality policies”[4].

In addition, Hussmann (2007) observes that “institutional arrangements to coordinate and oversee implementation of the initiatives are often ill-conceived from the start, as anti-corruption agencies usually do not have the authority, leadership and political backing to compel powerful line ministries to comply with anti-corruption measures[5].

Further, Hussmann (2007) argues that “putting anti-corruption strategies into practice is challenging for the simple reason that they cut across numerous public agencies, interact with other public management reforms and, most importantly, encounter high levels of resistance; and that “in most developing countries policy implementation phases are the ones where political and economic actors most vividly play their cards in an attempt to capture, torpedo, distort or sidetrack reforms in line with their interests”.

Severe mismatch between political problems and technocratic solutions[5]

There is often a severe mismatch between political problems and technocratic solutions. Thence, Hussmann (2007) argues that, despite the recognition that corruption is to a large extent a political problem, anti-corruption strategies or policies unfortunately deal with the phenomenon largely as a technocratic and procedural issue[6].

Enhance transparency

In hindsight, it is now argued that transparency may actually simply strengthen already-influential interests well-placed to capitalise upon access and openness, and can even facilitate corruption[7]. This is, wherein, transparency is not enhanced in a manner that does not provide citizens the incentive or reason to “look in” and feel safe to do so; and, to have the political resources and opportunities to act on what they see[8].

This Paper also establishes that, although there is “openness” in anti-corruption strategy or policy formulation in developing countries it is often more a product of the State elite than non-State actors, and that most stakeholders are generally ill informed about policy development issues, thus leaving the elite to fashion mass options in policy development and implementation. Further, during implementation the open and transparent spaces (the “look in”) for information exchange or the monitoring of progress are often closed, because, governments have had the tendency to close their doors; or only open selectively to identified non-State actors[9].

Laws, laws and laws; and, anti-corruption agencies

Many countries have anti-corruption laws on the books (even if penalties need updating) and an anti-corruption agency of some sort ((with numerous Donor funded intervention – the question of sustainability). However, societal behaviours are such that only a few individuals in our societies have a compelling stake in their success. In addition, support from the Courts and prosecutors is often weak or absent, and enforcement is often ineffective.

Civil Society impact

That civil society has a central role to play in corruption control is inarguable. However, the view of civil society participation in anti-corruption is often narrow and merely serves to have minimal impact. The problem is. Many civil-society actors exist in formal organisations that advocate reform as a public good; and, in developing countries such organisations are donor-funded, operate mostly in and around national capitals, and are guided by donors’ agendas[10].

The thought now is that, the strength of civil society actually lies in informal social groupings and activities that have little to do with public purposes yet still build social capital in the form of networks, skills, and trust that can be mobilised in the fight against corruption. Johnston and Johnsøn (2014) argue that, “collective action cannot rely solely on formal purpose-oriented organisations, but must engage a wider range of social ties and incentives”.

3.0  Best Practices in National Anti-Corruption Policies

This Paper, first, acknowledges that the author is averse to the term, “best practices”. For best practices are contextual, and the concept can sometimes be conceived to mean “one shoe size fits all”.

Michael Johnston’s introduction in “Reforming Reform: Revising the Anticorruption Playbook” aptly puts it. Johnston argues.

“Best practices” are elusive and do not always transfer well from one setting to the next. However, “better practices” are possible if we understand how corruption arises as a political and social issue, and how well governed societies got that way. We often turn history upside down, overemphasizing reform from above while neglecting contention from below; and get history backward by mistaking outcomes of contention for the causes of better government. “Deep democratisation”–enabling citizens to demand justice and better government–tailored to contrasting situations and syndromes may yield better long-term result” [11].

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the “best practices” in national anti-corruption polices, literature shows, among others, are those that focus on:

(a)   Blending localised knowledge, intent and purpose as critical elements of anti-corruption.

(b)   Legislative and other measures necessary to establish as criminal offences active and passive bribery when committed intentionally, and when committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities, i.e. including the private sector.

(c)    Measures and systems to facilitate reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their duties, and provide protection for doing so; and, with such measures being inclusive of members of the public - whistle-blower protection legislation.

(d)   Measures requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as public officials.

(e)   Rules of conduct for all public officials in order to strengthen integrity and prevent opportunities for corruption among its members.

(f)    Need for to encourage honest employees to raise their concerns and report wrongdoing within the workplace without fear, a crucial corporate governance tool to promote safe, accountable and responsive work environments

(g)   Need for multi-disciplinary approach as evidenced by having one agency specialised in investigating and prosecuting such cases.

(h)   A streamlined fast tracked procedure from charge to finalisation.

(i)     Target society based intervention seeking to influence change in behaviours and norms.

4.0  Retrospect - The effective way to fight an “enemy that fights back

First, we must accept that the failures of policies is because policies are created by a multiplicity of actors with a plethora of, often conflicting and at times changing political and financial interests.

One of the most salient features of public policy making is that, it is not a highly rational process with static goals. Thence, it is observed that, policy making is often a “fuzzy betting attempt to influence the probability to future situations”[12]. For, the major threat to anti-corruption policies is that they restrict power, as they affect the distribution of or access to political power and reduce opportunities to accumulate (illicit) economic wealth.

Second, corruption not only adapts to particular circumstances, but the circumstances may also adapt to established corruption dynamics; and measures that exclusively target corruption do not always make a difference[13]. Hussmann (2007) buttresses this argument by observing that – “Corruption is often compared to a disease or a cancer and just as in the medical field a reasonable diagnosis is needed to decide how to cure the disease by addressing its causes, not simply the symptoms”.

Third, corrupt individuals do not necessarily set out to win against those opposed to them, but instead to perpetuate or to create a status quo to increase their privileges or financial gain; thus, corruption could be considered an infinite game[14].

Fourth, corruption always has evasive action. It always gets us looking in the wrong direction, and draws us into a delusion of anti-corruption activity. Because, corruption always finds its way by changing the rules, overstepping them or taking new forms as the world evolves.

Lastly, corruption is cannibalistic.

In retrospect, it is inarguable that corruption is an “enemy that fights back”. How then do we effectively fight this enemy?

To understand, the effective ways, we here cite two critical viewpoints. These are from Daniel Kaufmann[15] and Corinna Wong[16] .

Daniel Kaufmann writes.

Corruption is a symptom of a larger disease - the failure of institutions and governance, resulting in poor management of revenues and resources and an absence of delivery of public goods and services. We must think beyond anti-corruption rhetoric and traditional tactics. We need to be more strategic and rigorous, identifying and addressing corruption’s underlying causes and examining the weaknesses in key institutions and government policies and practices. We have to focus our efforts on the broader context of governance and accountability. Only then can we see the many other shapes and forms corruption can take and address this epidemic[17].

And, Corinna Wong writes.

The fight against corruption is always more than bringing culprits to justice and plugging loopholes conducive to the crime. It is also about changing people’s attitudes towards corruption and misconduct. Corruption perpetuates if the population tolerates it and sees it as a way of life. On the other hand, in a community with a strong probity culture, people are more likely to appreciate fair competition, reject bribery, and cooperate with law enforcement agencies when encountering corruption. Public support is therefore fundamental to the success of an anti-corruption campaign”.

In conclusion, perhaps, the effective way to fight an “enemy that fights back”, this Paper observes, in part, can be learned from Corinna Wong’s TAPE. That is, anti-corruption should -

(a)   Have a Target - oriented strategy - customise anti-corruption services for different target groups;

(b)   Have an All-round communication strategy - integrate face-to-face contacts with multimedia publicity to spread the probity messages to people from all walks of life through multiple platforms.

(c)    Have a Partnership strategy - partner with different stakeholders in the community to promote integrity; and have an,

(d)   Engagement strategy - engage members of the public to take ownership of the anti-corruption cause and garner their support for preventive education activities.



[1] Reform public procurement process, public financial management systems, regulate emoluments in the public sector, et cetera.

[2] Adapted from Phil Mason - Twenty years with anti-corruption: reflections on reflections (https://www.u4.no/twenty-years-with-anti-corruption)

[3] Turner, M. and Hulm, D. (1997), “Governance, administration and development”, McMillan Press, London, UK

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hussmann, K. (2007). Anti-corruption policy making in practice: What can be learned for implementing Article 5 of UNCAC? Synthesis report of six country case studies:Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Zambia. U4 report 2007:1 (1st part), U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway

[6] Ibid

[7] Johnson, M. (2014). Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization. Cambridge University Press.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Hussmann, K. (2007). Anti-corruption policy making in practice: What can be learned for implementing Article 5 of UNCAC? Synthesis report of six country case studies:Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Zambia. U4 report 2007:1 (1st part), U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway

[10] Michael Johnston and Jesper Johnsøn (with Olivia T. Gamble), “Doing the Wrong Things for the Right Reasons? ‘Do No Harm’ as a Principle of Reform,” U4 Brief 13, December 2014, http://www.u4.no/publications/doing-the-wrong-things-for-the-right-reasons-do-no-harm -as-a-principle-of-reform/downloadasset/3696.

[11] 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

[12] Shull, R. (2007). Rush to Policy: Using Analytic Techniques in Public Sector Decision Making. Routledge

[13] https://voices.transparency.org/why-are-anti-corruption-success-stories-still-the-exception-9a30e5f4cf39

[14] Ibid.

[15] President, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)

[16] Assistant Director, Assistant Director of Community Relations Department of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, Hong Kong, China

[17] https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rethinking-the-fight-against-corruption/

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